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[53 C.2d

RE CoOPER

[Crim. No. 6510. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re GEORGE COOPER, on Habeas Corpus.
[Crim. No. 6511.

In Bank.

Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re ABE S. TOBEROFF, on Habeas Corpus.
[Crim. No. 6572.

In Bank.

Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re EDWIN D. RICH, on Habeas Corpus.
[Crim. No. 6573.

In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re ALBERT G. JEFFERIES, on Habeas Corpus.
[Crim. No. 6574.

In Bank.

Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re FLOYD L. CLEMENS, on Habeas Corpus.
[Crim. No. 6575.

In Bank.

Mar. 4, 1960.]

In re RALPH LEVERSON, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Extradition - Uniform Oriminal Extradition Act - OonstitutionaJity.-Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (part of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act), authorizing apprehension and extradition to
another state of one who has, either in this state or a third
state, committed an act intentionally resulting in a crime in
the state whose executive authority is demanding the extradition, is not invalid as violating the Constitution or statutes
of the United States. The federal constitutional and statutory
provisions are not exclusive, and the states are free to cooperate with one another by extending interstate rendition
beyond that required by federal law.
[2] Id.-Uniform Criminal Extra.dition Act-Persons Extra.ditable.
-A criminal who acts in one state to commit crimes in another
may pose a far more serious problem to the latter state than
one who commits a crime there and then fiees from justice,
and the Legislature validly enacted Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (a part
of the Uniform Criminal Extraoition Act), to pre ....ent the
state's unwitting provision of an asylum for those who commit

[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Extraoition, § 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Extradition, § 9.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Extradition, § 1; [2] Extradition, § 3;
[3-8] Extradition, § 9; [9,10] Extradition, § 14.
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[3]

[4]

[6]

[8]

[7]

[8]
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crimes without being personally present at the place where the
crimes are consummated.
lcl.-Demazul-Su1IicienC)' of Charge or Afticla.vit.-Since Pen.
Code, 11548.2, provides that the essential .facts supporting a
demand for extradiction may be charged either by an indictmeot, an information or by an affidavit made before a magistrate, it is immaterial that indictments for distributing and
advertising obscene literature did not allege the commission of
acts in this state resulting in crimes in the demanding state,
where such allegations were expressly set forth in the accompanying affidavits made before a magistrate by an investigator
of the district attorney's oftlce.
Id.-Dema.nd-Su1IicienC)' of Charge or Afticla.vit.-Since the
purpose of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure
immediate arrests but to convince the respective Governors
that extradition is justified, it is immaterial that the magistrate did not act on the affidavits by issuing warrants. Pen.
Code, § 1548.2, does not require that a warrant accompany a
demand based on an affidavit, but only that "any warrant
which was issued thereon" be included.
Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of Oharge or Aftida.vit.-Though affidavits on information and belief accompanying- a demand for
extradition do not set forth the amants' sources of information or reasons for belief that petitioners had committed the
offenses charged, the PUfpose of the requirement that they do
so is fully met when the indictments, also accompanying the
demand and charging distribution of obscene literature and
related offenses, establish reasonable cause to believe petitioners guilty of the offenses charged and the affidavits are
based on petitioners' California activities (resulting in crimes
committed in another state), it being presumed that sufficient
evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the
indictments.
Id.-Demand-SufficienC)' of Oharge or Aftidavit.-Pen. Code,
II 1549.1, 1548.2, do not provide that the indictment or affidavit alone must sufficiently allege all facts necessary to support extradition under I 1549.1; to add such a provision would
exalt form over substance.
Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of Oharge or AJlidavit.-Protection
from unjustified extradition does not lie in reading into the
extradition laws purely technical requirements that a forewarned prosecutor could easily meet, but in the sound judgment of the respective Governors charged with administration
of those laws. Their judgment is entitled to great weight.
Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of-Charge or AJlidavit.-When it appears that the affidavit supporting extradition was regarded by
the executive authority of the respective states concerned as
a aWRoient basis in law for acting-the one in making a requi-
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sition, the other in issuing a warrant for the arrest of the
alleged fugitive-the judiciary should not interfere on habeas
corpus nnd discharge the accused on teclmical grounds unless
it be clear that what was done was in plain contravention of
law.
[9] Id.-Habeas Oorpus.-Courts of the asylum state need not and
should not review the constitutionality of the statute alleged
to have been violated. Its constitutionality may depend on
how it will- be interpreted and applied by the courts of the
demanding state in defendant's case; but if it clearly appeared
that a statute were void on its face or had been held to be
void on its face by the highest court of the demanding state
or by the United States Supreme Court, the indictment, information or affidavit would then fail to "substantially charge
the person demanded with having committed a crime under
the law of [the demanding] State" (Pen. Code, § 1548.2), and
defendant should then be discharged.
[10] Id.-Habeas Corpus.-In habeas corpus proceedings challenging the validity of proceedings to extradite petitioners to
another state to stand trial for the distribution of obscene
literature and related offenses, petitioners could not successfully contend that the Supreme Court of the demanding state
in effect determined that the obscenity law under which they
were indicted was void on its face by its holding that a related
statute was void for vagueness, where there were substantial
differences in the two statutes, where similar statutes were
sustained by the United States Supreme Court, . . . where
the Supreme Court of the demanding state was free to interpret the statute in question to make it valid under the
federal decisions. The effect of a statutory amendment on
prosecutions commenced prior to its date was a question for
courts of the demanding state, and Congress has not preempted the field by enacting a federal statute punishing the
mailing or advertising by mail of obscene material.

PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus challenging validity of
proceedings to extradite petitioners to Pennsylvania to stand
trial for the distribution of obscene literature mailed from
California and related offenses. Writs denied and petitioners
remanded to custody.
Milton Wichner, Brock, Fleishman & Rykoff, Stanley Fleishman, -Prentiss Moore, George E. Lindelof, Jr., William A.
Munnell, Leonard S. Sands, Herbert S. Nusbaum and Edwin
M. Rosendahl for Petitioners.
[9] See Oal ..Tur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 44 et seq.; A.m..Tur., Habeal
Corp1l8, I f11 et seq.
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William B. McKesson, District Attorney (Los Angeles),
Jere J. Sullivan and Harry Wood, Deputy District Attorneys,
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By petitions for writs of habeas corpus
petitioners challenge the validity of proceedings to extradite
them to Pennsylvania to stand trial for the distribution of
obscene literature and related offenses. We issued orders
to show cause direct.ed to the sheriff of Los Angeles County
and ordered petitioners released on bail. In his return the
sheriff alleges that he took custody of petit.ioners pursuant
to extradition warrants issued by the Governor of California.
Copies of the warrants were filed with the return, and the
original supporting papers from the Governor of Pennsylvania to the Governor of California were lodged with the
court and a motion made that they be filed. These documents
disclose that petitioners were indicted for crimes committed
in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Three petitioners
were indicted for distributing and advertising obscene literature, and three for distributing and conspiring to distribute
such literature. The crimes were allegedly committed in one
case in 1956, in two cases in 1957, and in three cases in 1958.
Pennsylvania seeks extradition, not under federal law on
the ground that petitioners committed crimes in Pennsylvania
and then fled from that state (see U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2,
clause 2; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3182; Pen. Code, §§ 1548.1-1548.2),
but under section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act (Pen. Code, § 1549.1) on the ground that in mailing
obscene literature in California to Pennsylvania each petitioner committed "an act in this State . . . intentionally
resulting in a crime in" Pennsylvania. (Pen. Code, § 1549.1.)
[ 1 ] Petitioners contend that since such extradition is not
authorized by the United States Constitution or by federal
statute, section 1549.1 is invalid. It is settled, however, that
the federal constitutional and statutory provisions are not
exclusive and that the states are free to cooperate with one
another by extending interstate rendition beyond that required
by federal law. (People of the State of New York v. O'Neill,
359 U.S. 1 [79 S.Ct. 564, 568, 570, 3 L.Ed.2d 585]; In re
Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 677 [128 P.2d 338]; In re Davis,
68 Cal.App.2d 798, 802-807 [158 P.2d 36]; In re Morgan,
86 Cal.App.2d 217, 223 [194 P.2d 800] ; Ex parte Morga.n, 78
F.Supp. 756, 761, aff'd, Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F.2d 404,
407; see 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (1957) 299.)
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The United States Supreme Court approved such cooperation in sustaining a Florida statute (Fla. Stat. 1957, §§ 942.01942.06, F.S.A.) based on the Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings. (9 Uniform Laws Annotated (1957) 91.) "The'
Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It
is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements
which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative
actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony within the federalism created by the Constitution. Far
from being divisive, this legislation is a catalyst of cohesion.
It is within the unrestricted area left to the States by the
Constitution." (People of the State of New York v. O'Neill,
supra, 359 U. S. 1, 6.)
[2] Modern communication and transportation facilitate
the commission of crimes across state lines. A criminal who
acts in one state to commit crimes in another may pose a
far more serious problem to the latter state than one who
commits a crime there and then flees from justice. When
the criminal who commits his crime entirely in one state flees,
he ordinarily poses no threat of additional crimes therein;
if extradition fails, there is only frustration of that state's
interest in punishing him. In contrast, the criminal who
operates from without the state's borders poses a continuing
threat. Since his conduct may be undetected or apparently
harmless in the state where he acts, the only effective impetus
for prosecution may come from the state that suffers the
harm. Far more divisive than a state's refusal to extradite
a fugitive for a past offense would be its unwitting provision
not only of a base of operation but of an asylum for those
who commit crimes without being personally present at the
place where their crimes are consummated. The Legislature
validly enacted section 1549.1 to prevent that result.
Section 1549.1 provides that "The Governor of this State
may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority
of any other State, any person in this State charged in such
other State in the manner provided in section 1548.2 of this
code with committing an act in this State, Or in a third
State, intentionally resulting in a crime in the State whose
executive authority is making the demand. . . ." Section
1548.2 provides that the demand "shall be accompanied by
a copy of an indictment found or by information or by a
copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate in the demand-
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ing State together with a copy of allY warrant which was
issued thereon. . . ." In the present cases, each demand it>
accompanied by an indictment charging the defendant named
therein with committing crimes in Pennsylvania and an affidavit made before a magistrate by an investigator of the
district attorney's office. The affidavits are titled" Criminal
Complaint for Warrant of Arrest" and the facts stated are
set forth as "true and correct according to the best of [the
affiant's] knowledge, information and belief." They describe
petitioners' distribution of obscene literature in Pennsylvania
by mail from California and each contains a paragraph in
substantially the following form: "Deponent further avers
that, by reason of the said act and acts of depositing the said
literature and written and printed matter in the United
States Mail for delivery and distribution to the said private
citizens in and about the said City and County of Philadelphia, and well knowing and intending that the said literature would be so delivered and distributed, the said FLoYD
CLEJrlMENS did do such act and acts in the said State of
California which intentionally resulted in the commission
of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said
City and County of Philadelphia as prohibited by the Act
of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, and which
is against the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth."
[3] Since section 1548.2 provides that the essential facts
may be charged either by an indictment, an information, or
by an affidavit made before a magistrate, it is immaterial
that the indictments did not allege the commission of acts
in this state intentionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania.
Such allegations were expressly set forth in the affidavits.
[4] It is contended, howcver, that the affidavits are insufficient on the ground that the magistrate did not act on
them by issuing warrants. Since the purpose of affidavits
to support extradition is not to secure immediate arrests
but to convince the respective Governors that extradition
is justmed, it is immaterial that the magistrate did not
act on the affidavits. (People ex reI. Gates v. Mulcahy, 392
Ill. 498 [65 N.E.2d 21, 22] ; see People ex reI. Moore v. Skinner,
284 App.Div. 770 [135 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109] ; Ex parle Pe.airs,
162 Tex.Crim.Rep. 243 [283 S.W.2d 755, 756-757].) Thus,
section 1548.2 does not require that a warrant accompany
a demand based upon an affidavit but ollly that" any warrant
which was issued thereon" shall be included. (C/., In re

)
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Murphy, 321 Mass. 206 [72 N.E.2d 413, 417], applying Massachusetts statute requiring that warrant accompany the affidavit.)
[6] It is further contended that affidavits made 'on information and belief are insufficient to support extradition
unless the sources of information and reasons for belief are
stated so that the Governors involved and the court in habeas
corpus proceedinzs may determine whether extradition is warranted. (See Rice v. Amu, 180 U.S. 371, 374-376 [21 S.Ct.
406, 45 L.Ed. 577] ; Stark v. liivermore, 3 N.J. Super. 94 [65
A.2d 625, 627] ; People ex reI. Ma,eSherry v. Enright, 112
Misc. 568 [184 N.Y.S. 248, 252]; State ex reI. Phillips v.
Garren, 186 S.C. 333 [195 S.E. 834, 835] ; Ex parte Murray,
112 S.C. 342 [99 S.E. 798, 800, 5 A.L.R. 1152] ; cf. State ex reI.
Hogan v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193 [253 N.W. 668, 669] ; People
v. Mulcahy, supra, 392 Ill. 498 [65 N.E.2d 21, 22] ; Ex parte
Paulson, 168 Ore. 457 [124 P.2d 297, 302-303] ; People ex reI.
De Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N.Y. 417 [153 N.E. 853, 854] ;
Ex parte Oooper, 163 Tex.Crim.Rep. 642 [295 S.W.2d 906,
907] ; Ex parte Logan, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 129 [205 S.W.2d
994, 995] ; United States ex reI. McOUne v. Meyering, 75 F.2d
716, 718; Raftery ex reI. Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F.2d 189,
194; Ex parte Hart, 63 F. 249, 259-260 [11 C.C.A. 165, 28
L.R.A. 801] ; Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 307.) The affidavits
do not set forth the affiants' sources of information or reasons
for belief that petitioners had committed the offenses charged,
but the purpose of the requirement that they do so is fully
met when as in these cases the indictments establish reasonable
cause to believe petitioners guilty of the offenses charged and
the affidavits demonstrate that the indictments are based on
petitioners' California activities. Thus in each case the affidavit and indictment dovetail to meet the requirements of
sections 1549.1 and 1548.2. The affiants and other witnesses
appeared before the grand jury. Since it is undisputed that
at all relevant times petitioners have been in California, the
indictments are obviously based on petitioners' mail-order
businesses conducted from this state and concern the very
criminal transactions set forth in the affidavits. It must be
presumed that sufficient evidence was presented to the grand
jury to support the indictments, and as prosecuting witnesses
the affiants knew of their own knowledge that the indictments
were based on petitioners' California activities. Under such
circumstances the respective Governors were bound to know .
that the indictments were based on petitioners' activities set .
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forth in the affidavits, including their acts in California intentionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania.
[6] Sections 1549.1 and 1548.2 do not provide that the
indictment alone or the affidavit alone must sufficiently allege
all of the facts necessary to support extradition under section
1549.1. To add such a provision would exalt form over substance. [ 7 ] Protection from Wljustified extradition does
not lie in reading into the extradition laws purely technical
requirements that a forewarned prosecutor could easily meet,
but in the sound judgment of the respective Governors charged
with the administration of those laws. Their judgment is
entitled to great weight. [8] As the United States Supreme
Court stated, in reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to
support extradition pursuant to federal law, "When it appears, as it does here, that the affidavit in question was regarded by the executive authority' of the respective States
concerned as a sufficient basis, in law, for their acting-the
one in making a requisition, the other in issuing a warrant for
the arrest of the alleged fugitive- the judiciary should not
interfere, on habeas corpus, and discharge the accused, upon
technical grounds, and unless it be clear that what was done
was in plain contravention of law." (Oampton v . .Alabama,
214 U.S. 1, 8 [29 8.Ct. 605, 53 L.Ed. 885] ; see also State ex reI.
Trigg v. Thampson, 196 Tenn. 147 [270 S.W.2d 332, 333-334J ;
Stark v. Livermore, supra, 3 N.J. Super. 94 [65 A.2d 625,
627].)
Petitioners contend that Pennsylvania's obscenity statute
(18 Purdon's Pa. Stats., § 4524) is unconstitutional and that
therefore they should not be extradited for violating it. [9] It
has been held that the courts of the asylum state in habeas
corpus proceedings need not (Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311,
314 [15 S.Ct. 116, 39 L.Ed. 164]) and should not review the
constitutionality of the statute that is alleged to have been
violated. (In re Uran, 138 Ca1.App.2d 479, 480-481 [292 P.2d
225] ; Ex parte Key, 164 Tex. Crim. Rep. 524 [301 S.W.2d
90, 91J; UlZam v. Davis, 169 Miss. 208 [150 So. 519, 521] ;
Ex parte Peairs, supra, 162 Tex. Crim. Rep. 243 [283 S.W.2d
755,757] ; see also State v. Clough, 71 N.H. 594 [53 A. 1086,
1092] ; Johnson v. Matthews, 182F.2d 677, 682; Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308, 310-311; In re Backstron, 98 Cal.App.
2d 500, 501-503 [220 P.2d 742].) Its constitutionality may
depend on how it will be interpreted and applied by the courts
of the demanding state in the defendant's case. Of course, if

)
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it clearly appearcd that a statute were void on its face or had
been held to be void on its face by the highest court of the
demanding statc or by the United States Supreme COJIrt, the
indictment, information, or affidavit would then fail to "substantially charge the person demanded with having committed
a crime under the law of [the demanding] State" (Pen Code,
§ 1548.2), and the defendant should then be discharged. (See
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387,404-405 [28 S.Ct. 714, 52 L.Ed.
1113] ; In re Katcher, 39 Ca1.2d 30, 31 [243 P.2d 785] ; Cassis
v. Fair, 126 W.Va. 557 [29 S.E.2d 245, 249, 151 A.L.R. 233].)
[10] Petitioners contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has in effect determined that the obscenity law under
which they have been indicted (18 Purdon's Pa. Stats.,
§ 4524) is void on its face by its holding that a related statute
(18 Purdon's Pa. Stats., § 4528) is void for vagueness. (Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417 [153 A.2d 227].) We
have examined section 4528 1 and also section 4524 as it read
both before 2 and after 3 its amendment in 1957. Although there
'''Whoever gives or participates in, or being the owner of any premo
ises, or having control thereof, permits within or on said premises, any ,
dramatic, theatrical, operatic, or vaudeville exhibition, or the exhibition
of fixed or moving pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent,
or immoral nature and charaeter, or such as might tend to corrupt morals,
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sen·
tenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars (t500), or undergo '
inlprisonment for a period not exceeding one (1) year, or both. 1939,
June 24, PL. 872, ~ 528."
"'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gives away, or shows or
offers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show, or has in
his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away or to
show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, pLotograph, figure or image, or any
written or printed matter of an ind"ecnt character, or any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purponing to be for indecent or
immoral use or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws, photographs,
prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or prepares any
such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper,
paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing, or whoever writes,
prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed, published or uttered,
any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving information, directly or
indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, how, of whom, or by
what means any, or what purports to be, any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, disgusting or indecent book, picture, writing, paper, figure, inlage,
matter, article or thing named in this section can be purchasetl, obtained
or had, or whoever prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, or
shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, giye away, or
show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan or gift, or distribution, any
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the'
pUblication and principally made up of criminal news, police reports or '
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures of stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust or crime, or whoever hires, employs, uses or pennits any minor or
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are substantial similarities in language, there are also substantial differences, and we cannot say that because it invalidated section 4528, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
lle('essaril~' hold section 4524 void. Similar statutes were sustained as applied and interpreted in Roth v. Un'ited States and
Albc1'is v. California, 354 U.S. 476 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d
1498], and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is free to interpret section 4524 to make it ,-alid under those decisions. There
is no merit in the contention that section 4524 is void on its
face because it does not expressly require that the defendant.
haye knowledge that the proseribed material is obscene. The
statute may reasonably be interpreted as making knowledge
an element of the offense (see Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d
676,685 [249 P.2d 267) ; Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles,
39 Ca1.2d 698, 702 [249 P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145]) ; so inter-

)

)

child to do or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section,
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment. not cxceeding one (1) year, or to pay a fine not exceeding
five IJundrcd dollars ($500), or both. 1939, June 24, PL. 872,9524."
'" Obscene Werature consists of any writing, or printed matter, picture,
inmge, drawing, figure, photograph or other pictorial representation,
which is uurel:Jtcd to sciene,e, art or scientific study, and taken as a whole
is indecent, lewd, lascivious, and has the effect of inciting to lewdness
or sexual crime. 'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gil"cS away,
or shows or of! ers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show,
or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away
or to show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene literature
or lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pam·
phlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, photograph, figure
or image, or any written or printed matter of an indecent character, or
any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purporting to be
for indecent or immoral usc or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws,
photographs. prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or
prepares any such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, news·
paper, storypaper, paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing,
or whoen'r writes, prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed,
published or utt.cred, any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving
information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where,
ltOw, of wl,om, or by what means any, or what purports to be, any ob·
s~enE', lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting or indecent book, picture, writ·
ing, paper, figure, image, matter, article or thing named in this section
can he plJr<·ha.ed, obtained or had, or whoever prints, utters, publishes,
sells, lend,;, gives away, or 81,ow8, or has in his possession with intent
to scli, knd. give away, or show, or otherwise offers for pale, loan or
gift, or distribution, any pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed
paper de\'oted to the publication and principally made up of criminal
news, polirE' reports or 8C'('ounts of criminal deeds, or pictures of stories
of dE'E'ds of bloodshed, lust or crime, or whoever hires, employs, lIses
or permits :my minor or ehihl to do or assist in doing any act or thing
mentioned in this section, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction, shall
be sentenced to imprisonment not ('xeeeding two (2) years, or to pay a
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars (E'!WOO), or both. As amended
1957, July 17, P.L. 973, 91."
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preted it would not be invalid as imposing strict criminal
liability. (Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 514·515
[68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S.
273, 277 [35 S.Ct. 383, 59 L.Ed. 573].) Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 [80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205], is not to the
contrary, for in that case the state court had interpreted the
ordinance there involved as eliminating knowledge of the character of the proscribed literature as an element of the offense,
and it was only as so interpreted that the Supreme Court
held the ordinance void.
Petitioners contend, however, that the Pennsylvania Legislature has recognized the invalidity of section 4524 as it read
at the times here relevant by amending it in 1959 to set forth
the standard of obscenity approved in the Roth and Alberts
cases. The effect of the 1959 amendment on prosecutions
commenced prior to its date is a question for the Pennsylvania
courts, and we find no basis for concluding that that amendment absolved petitioners of responsibility for violations alleged to have occurred before its date.
Petitioners' contention that the Pennsylvania statute may
not be applied to their mail-order business on the ground that
Congress preempted the field by enacting the federal statute
punishing the mailing or advertising by mail of obscene
material (18 U.S.C.A., § 1461) was answered adversely to
them in the Alberts case. (354 U.S. 476, 493-494.)
The motion to file the lodged documents is granted. The
orders to show cause are discharged, the petitions for writs of
habeas corpus are denied, and petitioners are remanded to
custody.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and White, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-Although I agree that the interpretation,
application, and constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute
under which petitioners have been indicted are questions (at
least initially) for the Pennsylvania courts, I cannot agree
that the papers which accompany the Pennsylvania demands
for extradition are sufficient to support such demands. In
the case of each petitioner the only averment in such papers
that he committed "an act in this State . . . intentionally
resulting in a crime in the States whose executive authority
is making the demand" (Pen. Code, § 1549.1) is in the
"Criminal Complaint for "Tarrant for Arrest," sworn to before a magistrate by an investigator for the Philadelphia
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district attorney. Each such complaint avers that "to the
best of . . . [the affiant's] knowledge, information and belief . . . investigation and inquiry has disclosed" that the
named petitioner by dePQsiting obscene literature in the
United States mail for distribution to private citizens in
Philadelphia, "did do such act and acts in the said State
of California which intentionally resulted in the commission
of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said
City and County of Philadelphia."
I would not suggest that the governor or the courts of this
state, when extradition is sought, should go behind a formal
charge by information or indictment in the demanding state
and inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence. In re Letcher
(1904), 145 Cal. 563, 564 [79 P. 65], holds that such inquiry is not proper. However, I do believe that where, as
here, it is necessary to resort to an affidavit before a magistrate in order to determine whether the accused is extraditable
as one who intentionally committed an act in California resulting in a crime in the demanding state, averments on
information and belief which do not state the sources of
affiant's information or the grounds of his belief, are insufficient. The following considerations concerning charges
against those whose extradition as actual fugitives is sought
under federal statute are at least as applicable to the situation here, where the demanding state seeks the surrender of
persons who assertedly committed criminal acts in this state
intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state:
"A citizen ought not to be deprived of his personal liberty
upon an allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount
to nothing more than a suspicion." (Rice v. Antes (1901),
180 U.S. 371, 374 [21 S.Ct. 406,45 L.Ed. 577].) "Charges
are not verified by an affidavit that somebody is informed
and believes that they are true. This is mere evasion of the
law; the most improbable stories may be believed of anyone,
and the man most free from any reasonable suspicion of guilt
is not safe if he holds his freedom at the mercy of any man
three hundred [or more than two thousand] miles off, who
will swear that he has been informed and believed in his
guilt." (Swart v. KimbaU (1880),43 Mich. 443, 451 [5 N.W.
635], quoted with approval in Ex parte Spears (1891), 88
Cal. 640, 642 [26 P. 608, 22 Am.St.Rep. 341].)
Obviously extradition can result in great inconvenience
and substantial damage to the accused. While t.his state should
not hesitate to honor the proper demand of a sister state, it

784

.

IN BE COOPER

[53 C.2d

is my OpInIOn that when California sanctions the upsetting
of the life and affairs of its residents by surrendering them
to the authorities of another state, this state can and Rhould
require not merely a perfunctory assertion of belief by someone in the demanding state but a showing that there has
been an official determination in the demanding state resulting
iIi a formal charge by indictment or information or, if the
charge is by affidavit before a magistrate, a showing by such
affidavit that the charge is based upon something more than
the accuser's belief.
The return of an indictment presupposes the receipt of evidence before the grand jury and the filing of an information
presupposes that evidence has been appraised by the prosecuting attorney, an officer of the court experienced in evaluating evidence (and, in states with procedure such as that of
California, that witnesses have been examined before a'magistrate and the magistrate has found that a public offense has
been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the
defendant guilty of it). But a mere hearsay affidavit (even
where, like the complaints here, it is made by an official
investigator) stating that the affiant for undisclosed reasons
believes that the accused committed acts in California which
intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding state, in
my opinion, does not justify removal of the accused to the
state wherE' the affiant has expressed such belief.
The majority say (ante, p. 778) that "in each case the
[hcar:oay] affidavit and [the] indictment dovetail to meet
tll(' requirements of sections 1549.1 and 1548.2." They reach
this conclusion because, on their view, "It must be presumed
that . . . as prosecuting witnesses the affiants knew of their
own knowledge that the indictments were based on petitioners'
California activities" and "Under such circumstances the respective Governors were bound to know that the indictments
were based on petitioners' activities set forth in the affidavits,
including their acts in California intentionally resulting in
crimes in Penns?lvania," It does not appear to me that the
California courts must presume or that the governors of
Pennsylvania and California are bound to know that, because
the affiants for unstated reasons believe that petitioners com- '
mitted acts in California intentionally resulting in a crime
in Pennsylvania, the indictments which contain no such averments are in fact charges based upon such asserted California
acts and intentions. A sufficient charge of acts in California
intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state
I
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is a prerequisite to extradition under section 1549.1 of the
Penal Code just as a "substantial" charge of crime is a prerequisite to extradition under either section 1549.1 or section
1548.2. If the indictment wholly omitted to charge essential
elements of a crime, would the majority hold that these essential elements could be "substantially" supplied by the
affidavit before a magistrate, made by someone who was
also a witness before the grand jury, that he believed in their
existence' '1 would not.
In rejecting the contention that the affidavits are insufficient because the magistrate did not issue warrants of arrest
based upon them the majority say (ante, p. 777) that the
failure to issue warrants is immaterial" [s]ince the purpose
of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure immediate
arrests but to convince the respective Governors that extradition is justified." While I agree that the issuance of a
warrant of arrest by a magistrate of the demanding state is
not a prerequisite to extradition, the quoted statement of the
majority seems to contain the suggestion that where an indictment, information, or affidavit (yerified complaint) before
a magistrate in the demanding state is not a sufficient charge
to support extradition, that procedure can nevertheless be
effected if someone in the demanding state goes before a
magistrate and makes supplementary "affidavits to support
extradition. " I cannot agree with any suggestion that purely
evidentiary affidavits not charging a crime would be sufficient
to supplement a charge which is defective on its face (el.
In re Davis (1945),68 Cal.App.2d 798, 809 [3] [158 P.2d 36]).
For the reasons above stated, it is my opinion that the
petitions should be granted and the petitioners should be
discharged from custody.
McComb, J., and Peters, J 0' concurred.
Petitioners' applications for a rehearing were denied March
30,1960. Schauer, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., were of the
opinion that the applications should be granted.

